In this paper we examine the optimal level of central bank activism in a standard model of monetary policy with uncertainty, learning and strategic interactions. We calibrate the model using G7 data and …nd that the presence of strategic interactions between the central bank and private agents implies that optimality unambiguously recommends caution in monetary policy. An active policy designed to help learning and reduce future uncertainty creates extra volatility in in ‡ation expectations and is detrimental to welfare.
Introduction
Should a central bank be cautious or activist in its monetary policy? Central bankers on both sides of the Atlantic such as Blinder (1998) and Issing (1999) have recently stressed the practical importance of this question. Academic economists have responded to these concerns both by drawing on established work and by innovative state-of-the-art research. Over thirty years ago, Brainard (1967) recommended caution if there is uncertainty about the e¤ects of monetary policy, a result which was later challenged by Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) with the suggestion that policy should be more activist since we learn more about the key parameters of the economy that way. Recent studies by Wieland (1998 Wieland ( , 2000b have synthesised and developed these ideas.
In this paper we develop arguments suggesting that caution may indeed be the optimal policy. We argue that an activist policy translates into more volatile in ‡ation expectations, which cause problems for a central bank attempting to keep in ‡ation low and smooth output ‡uctuations. By being more cautious, the central bank is able to dampen the volatility in in ‡ation expectations and so create a more favourable environment for the conduct of monetary policy. To establish our result we use a standard monetary model, essentially that of Barro and Gordon (1983) , in a dynamic setting. Roles for uncertainty and learning are created by assuming persistent but unobservable regimes in which monetary policy has di¤erent e¤ects.
Our results depend on the strategic interactions inherent in the model, which create a link between the activism of the central bank and the volatility of in ‡ation expectations. The volatility of expectations reacts to the activism of a central bank because an activist policy produces more information, helping private agents to learn and adjust their expectations faster.
Existing frameworks, by not taking strategic interactions into account, do not adequately specify the costs and bene…ts of an activist policy.
The paper is structured as follows. Our model is described in detail in Section 2 and then calibrated in Section 3 using empirical estimates of asymmetric regimes in the G7 economies. Section 4 solves the model for di¤erent assumptions concerning central bank behaviour. We focus on how policies di¤er depending on how the central bank takes learning issues into account. Section 5 concludes.
The model 2.1 Structure of the economy
The economy is characterised by an expectations-augmented Phillips-curve relationship (1) between in ‡ation surprises ¼ t ¡ ¼ e t and output y t , de…ned as deviation from trend. In ‡ation ¼ t is assumed to be completely under the control of the central bank and is the instrument of monetary policy. 1 ¹ t is an i.i.d. output shock. It is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 1 Allowing the central bank complete control over the in ‡ation rate abstracts from uncertainties related to the monetary transmission mechanism. These could be incorporated into the model but would not a¤ect our conclusions.
zero and variance ¾ ¹ . The shock itself is unobservable to the central bank and private agents but a signal is observable, giving information about the current output shock subject to noise. We de…ne the activism of the central bank as the extent to which it reacts to the observed signal.
It is immediately clear from equation (1) To introduce learning issues we assume that the economy can be in either one of two unobservable regimes, s t = H or L, corresponding to high and low monetary policy e¤ectiveness. The regime-dependent parameter¯s t takes the value¯H in the e¤ective and¯L in the ine¤ective regime. Since this parameter di¤ers across regimes there will be asymmetry in the e¤ects of monetary policy on output, depending on which is the current regime.
The regimes are assumed to follow a hidden two-state Markov switching process, in other words the economy switches between periods of high and low monetary policy e¤ectiveness. The conditional probabilities of not switching regime, i.e. ½ H = P (s t+1 = H j st=H ) and ½ L = P (s t+1 = L j st=L ) are assumed exogenous although not necessarily symmetric. The higher the probability of not switching the longer the regime is expected to last. The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1 . The signal can be observed by the central bank before it makes its in ‡ation choice, but by this time private agents have already set their in ‡ation expectations for the period.
Since only the central bank is able to react to the signal it creates asymmetries and a basis for stabilisation actions. If the signal indicates a large positive shock the central bank is able to tighten monetary policy accordingly to minimise losses. The activism of the central bank is re ‡ected in the degree to which it reacts to the signal and is therefore measured by the di¤erence between in ‡ation ¼ t and in ‡ation expectations ¼ e t . The signal z t is assumed to be equal to the real output shock ¹ t plus a classical measurement error " t , as de…ned by equation (2) . " t is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and variance ¾ " . All variances are assumed to be known and independent of the regime so the signal extraction problem of the central bank is to make a best estimate of the actual output shock, given the signal received. The problem reduces to …nding the conditional distribution of ¹ t given z t . Equation (3) shows its solution, where the signal extraction parameter, Á, is de…ned as Á = ¾ ¹ =(¾ " + ¾ ¹ ).
Central bank loss function
The central bank is assumed to have a per-period quadratic loss function (1) and re ‡ate the economy through a positive in‡ation surprise. Rational private agents fully understand this incentive and so expect in ‡ation to be higher than zero. In rational expectations equilbrium, the central bank no longer has an incentive to re ‡ate the economy but there is a bias due to the non-zero in ‡ation. 
Beliefs
At any point in time the central bank and private agents have beliefs about whether the economy is in the e¤ective or ine¤ective monetary policy regime.
Since the information available to the central bank and private agents is identical there is no scope for asymmetry in beliefs and the central bank and private agents always agree upon the probability of being in a particular regime. The beliefs of the central bank when it makes its in ‡ation choice are the same as those of private agents when they set in ‡ation expectations because, even though the signal is observed in the meantime, the signal on its own says nothing about the current regime. It is only when the signal is combined with other information, notably the in ‡ation choice and realised output, that it becomes useful in inferring the current state of the economy.
The thus symmetric beliefs can conveniently be summarised by a single variable, p t = P (s t = H), which is the belief at time t that the economy is currently in the e¤ective regime. If p t = 1 then there is complete certainty that the economy is in the e¤ective regime. Similarly, p t = 0 implies that the ine¤ective regime is current.
Learning
Beliefs are not static in this model. Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) .
To see how an activist policy translates into faster learning in the model, consider the distribution of output y t conditional on prior information I t (¼ e t ; z t ; ¼ t ) and the state s t . Equations (5) and (6) show the distribution of output conditional on being in the high or low monetary policy e¤ectiveness state respectively.
Under a cautious policy, the in ‡ation choice of the central bank is close to that expected so the in ‡ation surprise is very small, i.e. (5) and (6) The fact that there are only a discrete number of states in the economy and that switching between states is exogenous means that the formation of beliefs takes a particularly simple form. A simple application of Bayes rule describes how beliefs are updated on the basis of new information. Equation (7) shows how the initial beliefs p t are updated to p + t at the end of the period, after the realisation of y t . Under such Bayesian learning, p + t depends on the relative probability of observing the outcome y t in the two regimes.
p + t is the optimal inference of the current monetary policy e¤ectiveness regime given the current realisation of output and the output signal. The central bank is hence able to make a prediction p t+1 of which regime will apply in the next period by taking account of the probability that there will be a regime shift at the beginning of the next period. In equation (8) the prediction is calculated as a weighted average of the probability of remaining in the high e¤ectiveness regime and the probability of switching out of the low e¤ectiveness regime.
Equations (7) and (8), combined with the normal distributions (5) and (6) for y t , give a non-linear equation (9) for updating beliefs. Updated beliefs are a function of the current belief, the in ‡ation surprise, the signal and realised output. B(¢) represents the Bayesian operator modi…ed to take account of Markov-switching e¤ects.
Rational expectations equilibrium
Private agents are assumed to be fully rational when making their expectation of the in ‡ation rate. According to the de…nition of rational expectations equilibrium these expectations have to be consistent with the actual behaviour of the central bank. In Figure 1 the in ‡ation expectations formed ex ante before the observation of the signal must be equal to the average in ‡ation choice made ex post by the central bank, i.e. in ‡ation expectations have to satisfy equation (10), where
is the in ‡ation choice of the policy maker given p t ; ¼ e t and z t .
Calibration
The model should be calibrated at a frequency that re ‡ects how often monetary policy decisions are made. In reality the stance of monetary policy is reviewed regularly by the central bank so a natural choice is to make the model monthly.
3 Table 1 shows our baseline calibration. The …rst …ve parameters in Table 3 are chosen on the basis of empirical estimation of the model for the G7 countries for 1980:1 to 1998:2. The …nal …ve parameters in Table 1 cannot be estimated directly from the data. In the baseline calibration we set y ¤ , the target for the level of output above trend, to be equal to one standard deviation of the output shock but perform sensitivity analysis for a set of values y ¤ 2 f0:015; 0:01; 0:005g. Since y ¤ is logarithmic these values correspond to target levels for output above trend of 0.5%, 1% and 1.5% respectively. Â re ‡ects the weight that the central bank places on in ‡ation as opposed to output deviations from target.
We have calibrated this parameter so that the average in ‡ation choice of the passive learning central bank corresponds to a monthly in ‡ation rate of 0.2%. The signal extraction parameter, Á, is di¢cult to calibrate so we take a range of parameters Á 2 f0:5; 0:75g. The standard deviation of the measurement error, ¾ " , is set to match the signal extraction parameter. The discount factor, ±, implies a quarterly discount rate of 1%.
Sensitivity analysis on the parameters y 
Results
We analyse the model under two di¤erent assumptions about how the central bank takes learning issues into account. Under the passive learning policy the central bank learns but makes no conscious e¤ort to adjust its policies to a¤ect the speed at which it learns. This policy serves as a benchmark in which the central bank learns but does not take into account that its current actions a¤ect future bene…ts and losses through learning. In contrast, with the active learning policy the central bank fully internalises the e¤ects of its actions on learning. We refer to this latter as the optimal policy. 6 We begin by de…ning a benchmark, the full information policy in which the central bank and private agents always know the true state of the economy. In this economy there is no role for beliefs or learning.
Full information benchmark
The full information benchmark would be followed by the central bank if the true state of the economy was always known with certainty. Under these conditions the central bank minimises the expected loss each period subject to the known Phillips curve. 6 The policy is optimal in the absence of a commitment technology by which the central bank can solve the time-inconsistency problem.
By substituting the Phillips curve into the loss function the problem can be written as equation (12) .
The only stochastic variable in this expression is the output shock ¹ t .
Hence we can use the conditional distribution ¹ t jz t » N [Áz t ; Á¾ " ] from equation (3) and then take the …rst order condition for loss minimisation (13) to derive the optimal central bank policy (14) 
Private agents take expectations of (14) to form their rational expectations of in ‡ation (15), which further implies that the rational expectations equilibrium level of in ‡ation is given by equation (16). 
Passive learning policy
The passive learning policy optimally accounts for current uncertainty but fails to realise that expected future losses can be a¤ected by adjusting current policy actions; learning is ignored. Since learning and the updating of beliefs are the only source of dynamics in the model, the problem of the passive learning central bank reduces to that of minimising the expected oneperiod loss function each period, subject to the Phillips curve. It is shown in equation (17).
The problem of the passive learning central bank is identical to the full information problem except that the state s t is unknown. Equation (18) shows that the expected one-period loss is a weighted average of the expected losses conditional on the true state of the economy. 
Solving the minimisation problem of the central bank gives the passive learning policy, in which in ‡ation is chosen according to equation (19).
Equations (20) and (21) characterise rational expectations equilibrium under this policy.
In ‡ation expectations given by equation (20) The dynamic simulations reveal that in ‡ation is more volatile than either in ‡ation expectations or in ‡ation surprises. Indeed, since by de…nition in ‡a-tion is equal to the sum of its expected and unexpected components, in ‡ation volatility is due to volatility in both expectations and surprises and their covariance. A simple ANOVA analysis suggests that approximately 25% of the volatility in in ‡ation can be attributed to volatility in in ‡ation expectations and 75% to volatility in in ‡ation surprises. 7 The …nal row of Table 2 shows the average per-period welfare loss calculated according to equation (4). 
Active learning policy
The work of Bertocchi and Spagat (1993) and Balvers and Cosimano (1994) suggests that the passive learning policy is suboptimal. They claim that a central bank should be more activist in its response to the observed signal because this provides valuable information about the state of the economy. 8 By being more activist the central bank learns more quickly about the economy and so is better able to stabilise output shocks in the future. This argument was made recently by Wieland (1998 Wieland ( , 2000b In the learning literature this behaviour is known as experimentation or probing.
This problem has a recursive nature so the active learning policy must satisfy the Bellman equation (23).
No closed-form analytical solution exists to this problem. However, Wieland The dynamic properties of the active and passive learning policies are compared in Table 3 . Under the active learning policy the volatility of in‡ation surprises naturally falls as the central bank becomes more cautious.
This decrease in volatility is generated by the central bank to dampen the undesirable volatility in in ‡ation expectations of the private sector. Indeed, the volatility of in ‡ation expectations also falls. The policy of an actively learning central bank therefore reduces the volatility of in ‡ation both directly through the volatility of surprises and indirectly through the volatility of expectations. The decreased volatility of in ‡ation has a positive e¤ect on welfare at only the cost of a small increase in output ‡uctuations. The …nal row of Table 3 shows that the average welfare loss falls with caution, despite rising output volatility. The relatively small welfare gain of active learning re ‡ects the fact that the costs and bene…ts of activism in this calibration almost exactly o¤set one another and the passive learning policy is approximately optimal.
Conclusions
We began this paper by asking whether a central bank should be cautious policy will be re ‡ected in a switch in the variance-covariance matrix whereas dynamic asymmetry will switch the autoregressive parameters. The choice of a 2-regime model was made for consistency with our theoretical analysis.
In stage 2, we use the Quah and Vahey (1995) procedure to identify in ‡ation surprises by the restriction that, whilst they may have a long-run e¤ect on in ‡ation, they have no long-run e¤ect on output. In contrast, output shocks may have long-run e¤ects on both in ‡ation and output.
For our estimation we used quarterly data from 1980:1 to 1998:2 for the G7 countries, excluding Germany. The …rst two columns of Table A beliefs, p t+1 , have been replaced by the non-linear updating equation (9) .
The expectation in (A.2) has to be evaluated by the central bank before the realisation of both current output, y t , and the signal of next period's output shock, z t+1 . Hence, before setting current in ‡ation, the central bank must calculate the double integral in equation (A.3). To calculate a rational expectations equilibrium we employ a simple iter- ; z t ). This procedure is iterated until convergence to a rational expectations equilibrium is achieved.
We use a uniform grid of 10 points over the state space p t for in ‡ation expectations and take starting values ¼ 
